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Abstract	  
The problem of Greek macroeconomics lay between the structural inefficiencies, the way 
development was comprehended and the way trade was carrying out in the context of the single 
market. The programs of fiscal and economic consolidation, introduced by the IMF, European 
Commission and ECB, embarked a new period for Greece characterized by continuous straggles 
and dilemmas. The main neoclassical approach provided by Troika for debt crisis in the case of 
the Greek economy seems to face significant obstacles. 	  
 
The present study is an assessment in the evaluation of the imposed austerity programs. The 
progress of the Greek deficit and debt represent crucial elements in this effort. Moreover the 
study of other economic indicators such as GDP and employment depicts the existing tendency 
in the Greek economy. Furthermore, the structural reforms consist another important part of the 
same discussion. Prior to all these, the determinants of the economic crisis will be briefly 
deployed and the main points of the implemented austerity measures will be presented more 
analytically.  
Key words: Greek economy, austerity, adjustment programs, fiscal consolidation, structural 
reforms, deficit, GDP 	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1. Introduction	  	  
The present study is an assessment on the programs of domestic devaluations that were 
implemented by the inclusion of the memoranda between the Greek government and the 
European Comission, ECB and IMF, in the Greek legislation (Monastiriotis, 2011; 
Theodoropoulou& Watt, 2011). The so far performance of the programs exhibits low 
correlation to the initial targets bringing the Greek economy into stagnation and the 
prospects of recovering into declining (European commission, 2013; IMF, 2011a; IMF, 
2011b; IMF, 2012; IMF, 2013a; IMF, 2013b). However, the political statements try to 
confound the generalized disappointment by introducing the Greek success story and 
the possibility of primary surplus in the budget of 2013. At the same time it is leaked 
that another memorandum between the Greek government and the Troika might be 
unavoidable, since the Greek economy is assumed to be incapable to finance its 
domestic and foreign liabilities after the end of the present financial support. 
 
For these reasons is of the outmost importance to examine the status of the Greek 
economy that would indicate the actual possibilities for recovery or further recession. 
This will be accomplished through the examination of the determinants in order to 
understand how the crisis was formed and enhanced. At this point, two levels of 
analysis will be attempted: the domestic distortions and the process of the European 
integration.  All together exemplify the configuration of the crisis and enable the link 
with the treatment and its correspondence.  
 
Thereafter, will be introduced the total of the legislation that validate the implication of 
the fiscal consolidation programs. The analysis is mainly distinguished in three parts, as 
many the memoranda implemented are.  After the presentation of the changes provoked, 
by referring the certain laws introduced in the Greek legislation there will be an 
overview in order to sum up the novelties of the consolidation program and how they 
were reflected in the annual budgets. This implies a first inquiry in the way austerity 
programs affect the economy. 
 
The study conclude examining the effects observed in the national accounts, in the 
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progress of the national debt and deficit, in the significance of the current account 
balance, in the level of unemployment and in the accomplishment or not of the 
structural reforms. The evidence mainly derives from the publications of the Ministry of 
Finance and IMF and the basic methods of analysis is based in the consideration of the 
tendency exhibited in the macroeconomic data and other kind of output along with the 
level of convergence or divergence to the original targets. 
2.	  The	  determinants	  of	  an	  inevitable	  economic	  crisis.	  
 
The crisis that burst in 2009 due to the revision of the statistical data of the state’s 
macroeconomic accounts led to a series of packages of fiscal and economic 
consolidation (Kotios, 2011; Matsaganis & Leventi, 2011). However, this scenario was 
more than expected. For the last decades Greece exhibited imbalances in the economic 
performance (Katsimi & Moutos, 2011) that were eventually burst in the second year of 
the global economic crisis. Although the economic crisis in Greece does not have the 
same roots with the bubble crisis of the US real estate sector, it provides some 
explanations about the time coincidence and the way the crisis in the Greek economy 
was initially driven.  
 
In this section, the Greek economic crisis will be approached through the analysis of the 
causal factors. This is a crucial assessment in order to identify the determinants and to 
understand the behavior of the crisis, which brings Greece in the fifth year of recession 
in the time of writing. The determinants of the Greek crisis will be approached by the 
analysis of the way the economic imbalances evolved over time and the way they were 
fueled trough the domestic governance and the process of European integration.  
2.1	  The	  domestic	  distortions	  and	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  economic	  governance	  
 
The analysis of the Greek economic imbalances is a part of a vivid discussion that 
evolved in public over the last years of the crisis due to the implementation of the fiscal 
consolidation programs and the emerged social complaints. However, the roots of the 
economic predicaments are going back some decades (Stathakis, 2010), since they are 
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intertemporal phenomena preserved by the two political parties that were toggled in the 
government. 
 
The years after the end of ’67-’74 dictatorship in Greece were characterized by an 
intensive boost of the economic activity (Moutos & Tsitsikas, 2010). By 1980 Greece 
exhibited a notable economic growth with an ensuing positive impact in the 
employment and other key economic indicators.  However, the entrance in the EU in 
1981 and the simultaneous winning of PASOK in the same year’s election signaled a 
different trajectory in the performance of the Greek economy. 
 
 
Graph 1: Greek growth rates evolution  
Source: Worldbank 
 
The socialistic profile of the government that was formed in 1981 and the positive 
conditions in the Greek economy derived by the previous good performance allowed an 
expansionary fiscal policy. That tendency can be summarized in a tremendous 
expansion of the public sector combined with a lavish macroeconomic management and 
public savings elimination (Moutos & Pechlivanos, 2013). Therefore, the public budget 
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However, the Greek weak productive structure was incapable to respond to the single 
market’s competition. Greek productive structure was based mainly on micro-
enterprises in the tourism sector and in agriculture while the tertiary sector was 
dominated by the public enterprises (Petrakos, 2013). These facts explain the restrained 
competitive capacity of the Greek economy that along with the increased tendency to 
consume more than Greek economy was able to produce concluded to trade balance 
deficit and restraint of savings. Moreover the membership in the European Union 
facilitated borrowing due to the low interest rates.  
 
 
Graph 2: Imports, exports and trade balance 
Source: Economou et al (2010) 
 
Furthermore, as Moutos (2013 & Pechlivanos, 2013) argue the increase of trades’ union 
power and the politicalization of the bureaucracy system played a significant role in the 
economic mismanagement as well. Above all, the most significant asset of the meager 
growth performance in Greece is the enhancement of the clientlism and corruption 
(Monastiriotis et al, 2013). 
 
Other important points in the economic performance of Greece are summarized in the 
reduction of the taxes on capital, extravagant military expenses, Olympic games cost 
(Tsakalotos, 2010) and great evasion due to the absence of a competent tax 
administration and sufficient legislation (Stathakis, 2010). All these facts advocated that 
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the development trajectory of Greece took part from the mid 90’s and lasted for about 
ten years was excessively unsustainable.  
 
At the time European North made improvements in its competitiveness by programs of 
strictly balanced budgets (De Gtauwe & Yuemei, 2013; Lapavitsas et al, 
2010;Tsakalotos, 2010), Greece was turned into an extremely unattractive for foreign 
investments country (Kotios, 2011). The contrationary fiscal policy implemented, as a 
Maastricht’s Treaty outcome, was undermined by an expansionary balance of payments. 
The demand was constantly kept above income fueling the German’s surpluses and the 
domestic deficits (Tsakalotos, 2010). However the nominal growth rates exhibited a 
Greek success that despite all the involved contradictions managed to create positive 




Graph 3: FDI 
Source: Economou et al (2010) 
 
However, the lying inefficiencies behind the success story of Greece led to the 
reduction of primary surpluses right after 2004 and deficit increase in 2008 
(Christodoulakis, 2011). The synchronous social unrest (December 2008) caused a 
serious political instability. Therefore, the government was in power was unable to 
implement an austerity program according to the imperatives of European economic 
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expenditures. Therefore in 2009 the status of the state’s macroeconomic image got 
much worse.  
 
The several revisions of the deficits and the government acceptance for the misreported 
data (Matsaganis & Leventi, 2011; Monastiriotis, 2011) stumbled on the international 
economic discomfort.  The Greek inaccuracy, due to the extravagant accumulation of 
debt considered as unsustainable, along with the EU inaction, due to the lack of its 
political integration (Krugman, 2012a) and its incapacity to exercise a relaxed monetary 
policy (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 2011) caused a catastrophic delay in decision-making 
(Christodoulakis, 2011). This led to a credibility and liquidity crisis, succeeded by 
spreads increase and the possibility of a Greek default (Monastiriotis, 2011, Varoufakis 
and Holland, 2010). In 2010 the European Commission with the contribution of the 
ECB and IMF agreed on a Greek financial support program and provided a 110 billions 
loan calming down the bond holders and provoking a series of domestic challenges  
(Christodoulakis, 2011, Monastiriotis et al, 2013) that will be analytically discussed in 
the ensuing chapters. 
2.2	  The	  European	  integration	  process.	  
 
The causes of the Greek economic crisis can also be found in the process of European 
integration. The inefficiencies in the architecture of the European Union and the policy 
responses at the emerged challenges formed at a certain level the springboard of the 
current crisis.  
 
The initial venture of the European integration stimulated the favorable conditions in 
the trade and increasing returns of scale economies and set common policies in the 
production and agriculture. The first enlargement took place in 1973 and soon after, in 
1975 European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established as the main 
financial mechanism for providing social and economic cohesion and correcting the 
imbalances among European regions (Europa, 2010). Greece was the tenth member 
state that joined the union and its accession signaled the second enlargement, towards 
south Europe that was integrated by having Spain and Portugal joining the community 
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in 1986. 
 
The presence of European Union in the Southern European countries requested for a 
different approach on the integration of the single market, since the performance and the 
production structure of the South diverged a lot from the countries of the European 
North. This turned the EU from a homogeneous Union into a diversified group of 
countries with dissimilar structure in their national economies and great variation in 
their performance. Further enlargements towards the EU of 27 magnified the 
imbalances in the European economy and implied cohesion policy as the key factor for 
addressing the emerged inequalities.  
 
The formation of the European Union is based on the integration of the single market 
and on the increasing regional disparities among European territory (Petrakos et al, 
2005). Regional inequalities create an uneven space in the European territory that is 
highly polarized between core and periphery regions (Rodriguez-Pose & Fratesi, 2003; 
Psycharis & Petrakos, 2004). Moreover the cumulative nature of the followed 
development plans reinforced the pattern of geographical inequalities, as “growth 
requires a minimum threshold of resources and activities to take place” (Petrakos et al, 
2005). In this context Greece followed the pattern of very centralized economic 
activities, mostly in Attika and Thessaloniki, initiating a period of growing regional 
inequalities (Petrakos & Saratsis, 2000; Petrakos, 2004; Petrakos & Artelaris, 2008). 
 
Greece having most of its regions categorized as “Objective 1” is considered to be 
favored with regard to the funds received. However, the tendency of their low 
contribution in a sustainable development strategy seems to be confirmed (Rodriguez-
Pose & Fratesi, 2003). It should be mentioned that not only European architecture but 
also inefficiencies in the domestic administration and corruption led to inadequate 
exploitation of the European assistance. 
 
It is also a matter of great significance to recognize the nature of economic activities 
developed. Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2003) note that the process of European 
integration favors concentration of economic activities in the core of EU while 
periphery regions are specialized in low value added activities.  In the case of Greece a 
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recent study confirms this point by proving that the growth of value added in most of 
the Greek regions is negative (Petrakos et al, 2012). Therefore multipliers effect is 
crucial to evaluate the contribution of certain economic activities in the development 
process. A multiplier rating lower than [1] can address an activity as one that reinforces 
the process of surplus transfer. However, it is difficult to collect that kind of data. 
 
Moreover, the European persistence on one or two priority areas aided a model of 
development based on “one size fits all” that underestimated the specific capabilities 
and constraints of each economy. The result of this approach can be found in the 
deconstruction of the national production structure in a quite ‘violent’ way (Stathakis, 
2010). After all, the performance of the Greek production sectors produced failing 
expectations for development (Petrakos & Psycharis, 2004). 
 
Graph 4: Evolution of the Greek production structure 
Source: Worldbank 
 
On the other hand, the Greek incapacity in the production was aggravated by the 
increasing demand for consumption (Tsakalotos, 2010). This tendency followed an 
asymmetric adjustment process that created the ensuing contradiction: the North 
European countries spent very little as a ratio to their output while the Southern ones, 
like Greece, had a quite bigger ratio (De Grauwe&Yuemei, 2013). This biased 
integration led to unbalance accounts and stimulated the debt (Lapavitsas et al, 2010). 
IMF, which became an expert at bail out in order to keep global accumulation on track 
(Harvey, 2006) was the only solution in the context of the dominant political system 
and memorandum of May became the adjustment to the economic reality (Kotios, 
2011).  
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2.3	  The	  crisis	  evolvement	  	  	  Along	  with	  the	  domestic	  inefficiencies	  and	  the	  European	  asymmetries,	  the	  financial	  sector	  had	  a	  discrete	  role	  in	  the	  evolvement	  and	  management	  of	  the	  Greek	  crisis.	  Although	  the	  Greek	  economy	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  sheltered	  from	  the	  global	  crisis	  due	  to	  its	  low	  involvement	  in	  the	  markets,	  however	  the	  markets	  through	  the	  rating	  agencies	  accelerated	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  crisis	  (Petrakos,	  2013)	  and	  the	  “financialization”	  of	  the	  economy	  (Lapavitsas, 2011) let the markets to drive 
the Greek crisis by the bonds transactions (De Grauwe & Yuemei, 2013).	  
 
The economic crises are categorized into three generations in the academic literature. 
The first one is implied by Paul Krugman (1979), who advocates that crises are 
provoked by speculative attacks that reverse the national expectations. These attacks   
are arisen by the dramatic increase on a currency demand that depletes government 
reserves on foreign currency in order to defend the exchange rates (Karfakis, 2010). 
According to Kohler (2012) the case of Krugman’s first generation currency crisis 
matches with the competition between US and Eurozone’s markets. The rational euro 
investors try to avoid the loss in US dollar value by betting against euro. However in 
this case the crisis bursts not at the time ECB’s reserves are depleted but when it comes 
to decide whether strict monetary policy should be followed or not.  
 
As Arghyrou and Tsoukalas   (2011) note, the timeline of events that resulted in the 
discussed crisis can be summarized in the markets confidence loss against Greek bonds 
that raised spreads and activated the factors of the first generation crisis. However, the 
ascending crisis in the Greek economy cannot be solely explained by Krugman’s theory 
on the first generation currency crisis inadequate and revealed the contribution of other 
factors on that (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 2011). 
 
Similarly, the second-generation currency crisis, developed in a model of Obstfeld 
(1996), explains partly the determinants of the Greek crisis (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 
2011). In this case, government chooses between defaulting and preserving the peg in 
order to balance credibility cost. However, peg is endogenous to private sector and its 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 11:51:53 EET - 137.108.70.7
Myrto Roza Tourtouri                                          An Evaluation of the Greek Austerity Programs                                                                                     
                               
	   10 
abandonment causes deviations from equilibrium. 
 
Various models represent the third generation currency crisis. In short, it relates the 
banking sector failures with government debt that its cyclical persistence may lead to a 
default risk. In Greece, bonds were part of a risky project that under no reforms, no real 
EU convergence and no crisis management mechanisms, forced bond prices to 
downscale (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 2011).  The approach of the third generation 
currency crisis provides the policy choices as the main determinants of crisis’s burst.  
 
All these depict a regime that generates design flaws with sudden liquidity losses 
(Varoufakis & Holland, 2012).  The borrowing transactions created an excessive debt 
for Greece that was no EMU mechanisms to correct (Mayer et al, 2012) and became 
unsustainable under the pressure of the international markets (Stathakis, 2010). The old 
inefficiencies were obscured by the temporary convergence but were eventually burst 
bringing the failures of financial system, EU integration process and domestic 
distortions to real economy. 
 
Moreover the overall inefficiencies took part in the European financial and economic 
integration process overlooked the default risk derived from the great imbalances 
among countries (Mayer et al, 2012). Finally, the refusal of Germany for a Greek bail 
out (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 2011) along with the EU and Greek delay to respond in the 
initial crisis’ signals (Chrhristodoulakis, 2011) indicate that there could exist a policy 
response that could give a different swift in the ensuing events. Greek debt crisis is the 
outcome of a series of mainly policy and economic failures that co-exist as inherent 
ingredients in the process of capital accumulation, European integration and in the long 
run inefficiencies in Greek governance.  
3.	  Review	  of	  the	  austerity	  legislation	  
 
Greece belongs to those EU member states that received one of the greater packages of 
external assistance (Theodoropoulou & Watt, 2011) and at the same time was subjected 
in a program of extended reforms that can be compared to the ones that Marshal plan 
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imposed (Monastiriotis, 2013). The program implemented on May 2010 introduced a 
period of social and political challenges caused by the actions for regaining competition 
through deflating economy by reducing nominal wages and prices  (Theodoropoulou & 
Watt, 2011). In exchange, Greece was provisioned loans of financial support in order to 
avoid the danger of a possible default that would cause greater imbalances in the 
Eurozone and spread of the crisis to other member states’ economies. 
 
However, there are many economists who disclaim the arguments of the above position. 
Varoufakis (2010), Lapavitsas et al (2010) address different options in order to counter 
the prevailing crisis. Proceeding in a Greek default and turning back to national 
currency or putting greater efforts on the negotiations with Troika could lead to more 
viable solutions for Greece, as they argue. On the other hand many others claim that 
austerity and the memoranda between the Greek government and the creditors was the 
one and only solution (Christodoulakis, 2011; 2013; Kotios, 2011; Monastiriotis, 2011; 
Monastiriotis et al, 2013).  
 
Apart from the discussion about the possible policy options prior to the implementations 
of the austerity measures, which constitutes a discrete survey, it is also a matter of great 
significance to define the way austerity affected the Greek macroeconomics. Hence, it 
should be examined which was the aim of the discussed measures, in which economic 
theory they are based, in which context they should be implemented and how Greek real 
economy interacted with them. In order to be able to do so, it is mandatory to recognize 
the novelties induced in the Greek legislation through the austerity program. 
3.1.	  The	  first	  memorandum-­‐	  the	  first	  adjustment	  program	  
 
The first memorandum between the Greek government and the “Troika” was voted by 
the Greek parliament on May 2010. It was supported merely by PASOK, the party in 
power.  All of the opposition parties vote against while PASOK itself lost some of its 
coherence.  Four months earlier the Greek prime minister made a declaration in the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, about the economic predicaments country was going 
through and just a month before the first memorandum became part of the Greek 
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legislation, he announced the need for economic assistance provided by IMF and EU.  
 
The first memorandum was incorporated into the Greek legislation and had a series of 
other laws that actually applied its directives. The novelties induced were mostly about 
the reduction of the public expenditures that aimed to be reduced even more in a three-
years long plan. Revenues were also contributing in stabilizing current account balances 
by introducing a more profitable tax system and creating collateral revenue sources. At 
that time the estimated gained financial advantages were grouped between revenue side 
and expenditure side as in the following table. 
 
 Revenue side (% of 
package) 
Expenditure side (% of 
package) 
2010 48 52 
2011 55 45 
2012 44 57 
2013 0.1 99 
Total 43 57 
Table 1: The distribution of measures between revenues and expenditures 
Source: Theodoropoulou and Watt (2011) 
 
First thing required according to the 2010 memorandum was to count up the total 
number of all public servants (Law 3845, 2010). This necessity signified a total 
decomposition existing in the sphere of public administration. It also asked for 
emergency measures to support the vulnerable social groups that would be less resilient 
in the process of fiscal consolidation and economic reforms (Law 3845, 2010). In the 
context of austerity, the welfare provision took place through the donation of vouchers 
for entering in the labor market (Law 3845, 2010). 
 
This regulation aimed to grant employers for hiring extra working force being 
unemployed rather than expend in non-productive activities. This is a significant 
neoliberal approach that assumes that the provision of welfare payments for 
unemployment is considered as an incentive for not working. However, the 
implementation of this act deregulated the labor law as it suppressed further the wages. 
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In addition, it provoked Greek state’s decoupling from the obligations of social 
provision. 
 
Further distortion in the labor market caused by the 8% reduction of wages, allowances 
and severance payments, limiting Christmas bonus at 500 euros, Eastern bonus and 
holiday bonus at 250 euros for public servants while the reductions were even higher for 
the pensioners (Law 3845, 2010). It is also worth mentioning the freezing of legal 
annual salary raise that was validated through the national collective bargaining 
agreement (Law 3871, 2010).  
 
Moreover it was also agreed to “decongest” public sector following the rule of “one 
employment for every five retirements” (Law 3845, 2010) and 50% reduction on the 
employees of fixed-term contracts in the public sector (Law 3986, 2011). Furthermore, 
the labor time was set at 40 hours per week increasing the weekly working time 2,5-10 
hours without giving a proportional raise in the salaries. In addition, the surplus 
personnel in the public sector would be set in labor reserve receiving the 60% of its 
previous salary (Law 3986, 2011). 
 
All these consent to a smaller public sector and to the elimination of its expenditures in 
order to combat the increasing deficits. According to the neoliberal view on the state, its 
role is to provide public goods and to correct market imperfectness. When the state has 
limited competences its functions should be constrained in the preservation of the 
macroeconomic stability and countering poverty (Thirlwall, 1996). In other words “the 
state should rather be the steersman than the rower” (Thirlwall, 1996). Therefore, its 
restrained presence should leave space for the development of private initiative as the 
flagship of efficiency in the economic activities. 
 
The first Memorandum, based on these principles implied a plan of excessive 
privatizations (Law 3845, 2010), which was hindered due to indecision, political cost 
(Christodoulakis, 2011) and lack of experience and a previously existing legislative 
context. Law 3986 (2011) tried to counter this shortcoming introducing TAIPED 
(Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund) a body for operating the privatizations by 
preparing and executing all the required actions (Law 3985, 2011; Law 3986, 2011).  
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Further injections in the market were provided by the raise in the limit of collective 
dismissals from 20 to 150 and in the firms with more than 200 employers from 2% to 
5% (Law 3863, 2010), extended in the trial period from 2 to 12 months that a firm can 
dismiss its personnel without being obligated to give severance pay, and the provision 
of just the 80% of the salary for employing the youth until the age of twenty-four (Law 
3845, 2010).  Other similar measures are the 20% reduction for the overtime pay (Law 
3863, 2010) and the abolition of overtime pay for part-time workers with working time 
less than 20 hours per week (Law 3899, 2010).  
 
Theses regulations derived from the agreement between the Greek government and 
Troika are based on the neoliberal theory. According to this point of view, the reduction 
of the labor cost can enhance labor demand (Tsoulfidis, 2008) and combat 
unemployment.  In this context, the Bolkestein directive was also adopted in the Greek 
legislation through the Law 3844 (2011) for the linearization of the closed professions. 
 
On the revenue side, the first memorandum implement the raise of VAT taxation up to 
23%, induced increased excise duties’ rates and extraordinary lump sum contribution 
for incomes greater than 100.000 euros annually varying from 4% to 10 % (Law 3845, 
2010). This program aimed on a 4% increase in the revenues by 2013 and a 7% 
reduction on public expenses by the same year (Law 3845, 2010).   
 
The overall measures depicted 2,5% of GDP and were planned to reduce 2009’s deficit 
to 8,1% in 2010. The measures according to the first memorandum would be increased 
to 4% in 2011 and follow a downward turn in 2012 reaching 2,5% of GDP and 2% in 
2013.The first memorandum consists of a frontloaded economic program that would 
gradually be smoothened in order to cope with the expecting fatigue. Positive growth 
rates were assessed by 2012, lowering deficit under 3% by 2014 and exhibiting 5% 
current account surplus by 2020 (Law 3845, 2010). However, the targets related to the 
post 2010 period were revised according to the requirements of the subsequent 
agreements. 
 
The fiscal consolidation would be managed according to the voted legislation (Law 
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3845, 2010) through the implementation of a sustainable income policy and reduction 
of the insurance provision. For this reason it was also crucial to merge public bodies and 
cut social expenses. Health sector was also subject to reforms changing the pattern of 
medicals prescriptions’ writing and execution. The reforms in the health sector would 
be integrated by the return of all the relevant responsibilities in the Ministry of Health 
and also by the mergence of relevant funds and by the simplification of the fragmented 
health sector (Law 3845, 2010).  
 
Moreover it was also scheduled to decouple health sector from retirement (Law 3845, 
2010) and to merge the different insurance funds into three that would link the 
contribution with provision (Law 3845, 2010; Law 3865, 2010). Since the reserves of 
insurance funds were vanished due to the chronic mismanagement (Vasilakis, 2012) 
insurance funds used part of the annual budget resources contributing in the deficit 
increase. Therefore, the first memorandum apart from pensions reduction rose the 
retirement age at 65 and announced future adjustments according to the variation of the 
life expectancy indicators (Law 3845, 2010; Law 3863, 2010;Law 3865, 2010). 
 
The tax system reform aimed to the expansion of the tax base and the implementation of 
criterions of gradual taxation (Law 3845, 2010). Other objectives are summarized in 
combating tax evasion, since Greece has a significant economic drain due to the 
magnitude of grey economy, issuing of VAT receipts and establishing evidence on 
living standards (Law, 3845, 2010) 
 
Besides, the financial and banking sector was considered as reliable due to the 
enhancement of its capital position providing 3,8 billion euros in 2009 that encouraged 
its position and cover the required capital adequacy (Law 3845, 2010). However the 
diminishing profitability set in danger the current capital position of the Greek banking 
system. Therefore, the first memorandum introduced the Fund of Financial Stability in 
order to monitor progress in the Greek banks capital position and to undertake 
prevention measures (Law 3845, 2010).  
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3.2	  The	  second	  memorandum-­‐	  the	  second	  adjustment	  program	  	  
The second memorandum was confirmed on January of 2012 by Papadimos 
government, supported by the two greater parties, PASOK and New Democracy and 
also by the nationalist party of LAOS. It was a consequence of several failures in the 
implementation of the first consolidation program mainly related to fiscal policy, 







The agreed fiscal consolidation measures were partially 
implemented. The end-December quarterly 
performance criteria on the cash general government 
primary deficit and the state primary expenditure were 
respected. There was some reduction in the stock of 
arrears owed to suppliers. The ESA-based 2011 deficit 
exceeded the ceiling established at program inception, 










The quantitative cumulative criterion on privatization 
receipts for end- December was missed by a small 
margin; several transactions for 2012- 13 are under 
preparation. Further measures have been adopted in 
relation to the fight against tax evasion and public 
finance management, and restructuring of public 
enterprises. However, the fight against tax evasion 
cannot yet be considered as successful, and there were 
delays in several specific revenue administration 
measures. Likewise, several measures to strengthen 
public financial management were missed. There were 
also issues in healthcare reform, and the framework 







Payments into the intermediate account of the Hellenic 
Stability Fund continued according to plans until end-
2011. A detailed diagnostic of loan portfolios of banks 
was prepared. The State increased the ATE share 
capital. Governance rules were reviewed in preparation 
of the post-PSI bank recapitalization. 
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After attempting a dialogue with social partners, the 
Government adopted several labor market measures, 
including a reduction in minimum wages and changes 
in wage bargaining. Progress in several other areas has 
been slower, in particular on business environment 
related measures and the opening of the energy market. 
Table 2:  First adjustment program failures and achievements 
Source: European Commission (2012) 
 
Therefore, the second memorandum depicts an updated version of the first one. It was 
justified as a reform for promoting three key issues for a new loan contract that would 
provide a first payment of 37,5 billion euros, for the Greek PSI and for the 
recapitalization of the Greek banks. However apart from these, the second 
memorandum reset regulations for the labor market and the revenue policy.  
 
In more details after the payment of 35,7 billion euros there would be a restructuring of 
debt and interest payment until the PSI, which signifies a program of Greek bonds 
exchange. In the causal report, the second memorandum addressed financial assistance 
facility agreement between the European Fund of Financial Stability, Greek Republic 
and Greek Central Bank. The discussed agreement aimed on new financial liabilities of 
the Greek state about 30 millions euros, excluding interests, for financing the PSI and 
reduction of the Greek debt analogous to the nominal value of the Greek bonds. 
Moreover it was planned a temporary raise in the Greek debt until the PSI for rebuying 
the Greek bonds that were hold in the European Fund of Financial Stability and for 
paying the interests. 
 
It was also requested 23 billions euros to be donated for banks recapitalization and the 
loss of bonds haircut in the Insurance Funds. This would be counterbalanced by the 
creation of a fund that transect parts of public property as reimbursement. 
 
As far considers reforms in the labor market Law 4046 (2012) promoted a reduction of 
22% in the basic income, from 751 euros to 586 euros gross, and 32% for the youth 
under the age of 25 with practice contracts diminishing the salary from 751 to 511 euros 
gross. This change required merely one-sided actions. According to the Cabinet 
Decision n.6 (2012) all salary raises were frozen until unemployment fell under the 10% 
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threshold. Exception in this regulation was the salary raise due to the raise of total 
working years. 
 
Moreover the second memorandum aimed on the 15% reduction of marginal labor cost 
during the fiscal consolidation program (Law 4046, 2012) and assessed on being in 
compliance with the labor cost of other countries, which are under programs of fiscal 
consolidation (Law 4046, 20102). Temporary employment was also established through 
the removal of restrictions that were relevant with the legal form of the corporation that 
stimulated that kind of activities (Law 4038, 2012).  
 
Moreover, Law 3986 (2011) was modified through the expansion of reserve labor 
system for all the public sector personnel with contracts of indefinite duration and the 
ones being in the pre-retirement period (Law 4024, 2012). Their position was abolished 
and the employees set on labor reserve either they were to be fired, or paid 60% of their 
salary for 24 months until being fired if not been absorbed from other public bodies. 
 
Security in the wok was also abolished according to the required minimum standards 
introduced by the Law 4052 (2012). Moreover, labor dispute was to be resolved through 
the Labor Referee if only both sides agree to act so (Cabinet Decision n.6, 2012). 
Refereeing had to resolve solely issues related to the basic salary agreements 
considering at the same time the economic status and the competitiveness of the firm 
and also the marginal labor cost reduction needed (Modification of Law 3899, 2012). 
 
In addition, the Business Contracts was agreed to override the Collective Bargaining 
Agreements (Law 4024, 2012). The pertinent Minister also lost its competence to 
expand Collective Bargaining Agreements in order to counterbalance the lack of any 
kind of collective agreements. Furthermore, it was also consented to diminish the 
duration of bargaining agreements application after the dismissal, from six to three 
months with the obligation of paying solely the basic salary and no more than four 
bonuses (Cabinet Decision n.6, 2012). The duration of Collective Bargaining 
Agreement was set at three years long but the possibility of bargaining privately the 
labor contracts was also introduced (Cabinet Decision n.6, 2012). 
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A total of regulation related to the way union activities were exercised was also 
confirmed. The Union could be replaced by the agreement of 60% of the stuff in matters 
of new Collective Bargaining Agreement confirmation (Law 4024, 2011). The process 
of Union’s formation was also simplified and accelerated (Law 4024, 2012) and the 
employees right for discussion and information was also regulated according to 2009/38 
European Directive (Law 4052, 2012) 
 
The permanency in the public sector was abolished through the Cabinet Decision n.6 
(2012) and government gave its commitment for 150.000 staff reduction by 2015. On 
the contrary unemployment planned to be combated by the introduction of Social Co-
operatives in the Greek legislation (Law 4019, 2011).  The aim of this venture was to 
involve in the market the vulnerable parts of the society in an active way (Law 4019, 
2011). Moreover, European Funds were to be stimulated for creating labor supply for 
public benefit work, exercised in local administration bodies (Law 4024, 2011) 
 
National health system reforms continued by reducing 1 billion euros the health 
expenses for the private health sector. The profit rate of the pharmacies was 15% 
reduced and 5% reduced for the pharmaceuticals wholesale (Law 4046, 2012). Internal 
auditors were to be placed in the public hospitals and the use of generic medicines was 
promoted  (Law 4046, 2012). Public supplying had to be recorded in an online platform 
in order to be monitored for corruption and overpricing avoidance.  
 
Insurance Funds were also subjected to further reforms. The existing Insurance Funds 
were merged into one for reducing the previous running and wage cost at least 30% 
(Law 4046, 2012). Subsidiary pensions had to be reduced in order to eliminate the 
increasing deficits in the Insurance Funds. Pension computerization was induced and 
lump sum given as retirement allowance that exceeded the total employees’ 
contributions had to be returned (Law 4046, 2012). On the contrary, the social 
contributions to IKA (Institute of Social Insurance) were 5% reduced. 
 
Privatization of the Greek public property was set in front again aiming 50 billion euros 
pour into state funds. Therefore, DEI (Public provision of electricity) and DEPA (Public 
gas corporation) were the first public enterprises to get privatized. At the same time the 
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public transportation increased its tickets by 25%. Other state bodies with great social 
significance but with little contribution to growth were decided to close down such as 
the Organization for Workers Residence (Law 4046, 2012).  
 
It was also aimed to increase tax revenues by the abolition of previous tax exemptions, 
revisal of private real estate value, intensifying the audits of high incomes and setting 
strict penalties for tax liabilities (Law 4046, 2012). On the other hand, it was decided to 
close down about 200 tax offices and to replace tax payments by making remittance 
(Law 4046, 2012). The performance of every tax office would be publicized online, in 
order to engage them with the national targets (Law 4046, 2012). 
 
Closed professions were subjected to liberalizations, first implementation of the 
measure affected taxi driving (Law 4046, 2012). Other structural reforms promoted by 
the second memorandum that had to do with the efficiency of judicial system by setting 
timelines and relieving judges from certain liabilities (Law 4046, 2012).  
3.3	  The	  third	  memorandum-­‐	  the	  mid-­‐term	  plan	  for	  2013-­‐2016	  	  	  
The third memorandum was induced after two elections that took place on May and 
June 2012 that designated New Democracy as the leading party in the trilateral 
government that was formed. The political milieu was subject to major changes that 
shrank PASOK, turned SYRIZA, a left-wing party of limited influence, into the main 
opposition party and also brought right extremists in the parliament.  
 
The previous programs of fiscal adjustment plan had to be revised due to the 
unexpected intensity of the recession. In this direction, the program extended for two 
more years reducing the measures at 11,5 billion for the period 2013-2014 instead of 
20,5 that was originally planned to set (Memorandum of Understanding, 2012). As been 
declared in the Memorandum of Understanding (2012) between the Greek government 
and Troika, the extension of the program would secure the fiscal position of the Greek 
economy and would mitigate the impact of the taken measures. In addition, the targets 
of the Memorandum of Understanding (2012) about the primary balance were set at 0%, 
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1.5%, 3% and 4.5% of GDP for the four-year period 2013-2016, respectively. 
However, this extension should not discourage the efforts needed. Hence the measures 
of fiscal adjustment remained frontloaded and would credit 1,5% of GDP improvements 
at the primary balance in 2013 (Memorandum of Understanding, 2012). The needed 
measures for the period 2013-2014 for the revised primary balance targets in the central 
macroeconomic scenario amounted to €9.2 billion and €13.5 billion, respectively. 










I. Revenues 50.821 49.564 48.309 48.050 
1.Net revenues of the 
regular budget 
45.685 44.972 45.249 46.299 
a.Regular revenues 47.114 46.250 47.370 48.459 
  1.Direct taxes 20.117 19.439 19.729 19.863 
  2.Indirect taxes 24.604 24.378 25.001 25.732 
  3.European deliverability 236 163 217 217 
  4.Non tax revenues 2.157 2.270 2.423 2.647 
b.Non regular revenues 1.386 1.357 757 791 
c. Tax refunds 2.901 2.865 2.899 2.972 
d. Revenues from assigning 
permissions or licensing  
86 230 21 21 
2. Revenues from Budget of 
public Investments  
5.136 4.592 3.060 1.751 
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a. European inputs 4.936 4.392 2.860 1.551 
b. Own Resources 200 200 200 200 
II.  Expenditures 60.307 56.586 56.586 56.384 
1. Expenditures of the 
regular budget 
53.457 49.886 49.886 49.684 
a. Primary expenditures  44.750 41.421 40.834 40.689 
  1. Wages and pensions 18.599 18.077 17.881 17.768 
  2. Social insurance and 
health care 
14.969 12.701 12.086 11.791 
  3. Function and other kind 
of expenditures 
6.305 6.012 6.136 6.147 
  4. Credits 3.777 3.511 3.531 3.783 
  5. Non distributed expenses 0 0 0 0 
  6. Reserves 1.100 1.120 1.200 1.200 
b.1. Sureties to General 
government 
558 494 397 440 
    2. Sureties other than to 
General government 
469 268 225 158 
c. Interests 6.400 6.900 7.200 7.300 
d. Expenditures of EFSF loan 
disbursement  
130 110 80 50 
e. Hospital payments for 
previous liabilities 
400 400 400 400 
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f. Expenditures for military 
procurement 
750 583 750 647 
2. Budget of Public 
Investments 
6.860 6.700 6.700 6.700 
III. Deficit of State Budget -9.480 -7.312 -8.277 -8.334 
% GDP -5,52% -4,0% -4,4% -4,2% 
III. A. Primary outcome -3.086 -412 -1.077 -1.034 
National auditing 
adjustments of central 
government 
-2.912 -3.330 -3.369 -1.5776 
Deficit of Central 
Government according to 
ESA95 
-11.219 -8.736 -9.474 -7.728 
Balance of Organization of 
Local Administration 
according to ESA95 
589 795 908 950 
Balance of ΟΚΑ according 
to ESA95 
2.730 2.787 1.601 2.225 
Deficit of General 
Government according to 
ESA95 
-7.900 -5.154 -6.965 -4.552 
% GDP -4,3% -2,8% -3,7% -2,3% 
Primary outcome of 
General Government 
according to ESA95 
489 4.471 3.692 6.350 
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%GDP 0,3% 2,4% 2,0% 3,2% 
GDP 183.049 182.682 187.810 196.552 
Table 3: 2013-16 budget forecast 
Source: Law 4127 (2013) 
 
The program implied a plan of two years period frontloaded measures of 13,5 billion 
(Law 4093,2012; Law 4127, 2013). The fiscal adjustment was constructed by 10,5 
billion that derive from expenditures reductions and another 3 billion generating from 
tax revenues (Law 4093,2012; Law 4127, 2013). In 2013 9,2 billion of the total amount 
of measures was agreed to be implemented (Law 4093,2012; Law 4127, 2013). The 
wages and pensions were subjected to measures of 6,6 billion (Law 4093,2012; Law 
4127, 2013) setting also a stipulation for their extension in case of deviating from the 
fiscal targets (Law 4093,2012). 
 
On the other hand, it was also agreed to undertake equal measures, in case of achieving 
the targets. In each case, recession was assessed to be about 4,2% for the year 2013. The 
program was pre-required in order Greek government disbursed 31,5 billion and 
channel them to the Greek economy. 
 
In more details, as far considers the wage and pension expenditure in the public sector 
would be reduced to 1,1 billion and 4,8 billion, respectively (Law 4127, 2013). This 
would be achieved by abolishing the Christmas, Easter and holiday bonuses for both 
salaried and pensioners (Law 4093, 2012) which were estimated at 430, 6 millions (Law 
4127, 2013). Special wage professions (public health system doctors, academics, high 
priests, civilian personnel in ministries and decentralized administration, diplomatic 
corps, military commanders) were subjected to public sector’s unitary paying and their 
allowances were also cut (Law 4093, 2012) saving 264,1 millions for 2013 (Law 4127, 
2013). Remunerations of elective personnel in local administration were also agreed to 
be 50% reduced and the representation expenses were also completely abolished (Law 
4093, 2012). 
 
In addition, the public sectors pensions that were paid simultaneously with the other 
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remuneration were 70% cut (Law 4093, 2012). The second main pensions had to be cut 
about 20-30%, according to the level of the pension (Law 4093, 2012). All the pensions 
higher than 1000 euros were to be cut 5%, higher than 1500 euros were to be cut 10% 
and higher than 2000 euros were to be cut 15%. The 13th and 14th pensions were 
abolished (Law 4093, 2012).  Furthermore, all the pensions received, from the ETEA 
fund, by ex unionists were also to be abolished unless this was the only pension 
received (Law 4093, 2012). 
 
The retirement age was raised by two years and the EKAS  (allowance for the low 
pensioners) agreed to be received after the age of 65 (Law 4111, 2013). Moreover, the 
retirement lump sum, was to be cut from 2%, for the metal workers, to 63,91%, for the 
employees in pharmaceutical work (Law 4093, 2012). The retirement lump sum 
received from 2014 and on, would be reconsidered in a new technical base (Law 4093, 
2012) according to the sustainability of the funds. Pensioners who received their 
retirement lump sum after 1995 were to be burdened with a 3%  tax on their basic 
pension (Law 4093, 2012).  
 
All insurance contributions, for those been insured before 1993 were raised (Law 4093, 
2012). This would generate some 608 millions (Law 4127, 2013).  Social allowances of 
uninsured elders were cut from 30 to 50 euros, depending on the value of the property 
they owned and the eligibility age raised to 67 (Law 4093, 2012). Special 
unemployment allowances were abolished preserving merely those for long-run 
unemployment with income less than 10.000 euros per year (Law 4093, 2012). 
 
In the health sector the reforms continued for the mergence of all insurance funds into 
EOPYY- National Organization for Health Care (Law 3054, 2012). The promotion of 
generics was to be achieved by the medicine prescription according to the active 
substances and not certain medicinal products (Law 4052, 2012; Law 4093, 2012; Law 
40172, 2013). The claw-back was established at 2,4 millions for 2013 and also the 
institutional context for this mechanism was to be set (Law 4093, 2012, Law 2045, 
2013). Moreover the function cost of the public hospitals would be reduced at 29,3 
millions for 2013 and the implementation of the new healthcare map would reduce 36 
millions the hospital expenses (Law 4093, 2012; Law 4127, 2013). 
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The public education was subjected to 24,3 millions cuts through the mergence of 
various university departments or closures (Law 4093, 2013; Law 4127, 2013, Law 129, 
2013). In addition through the reduction of the collateral academic staff another 8,9 
millions would be saved (Law 4127, 2013). In the secondary education the reduction of 
the non-regular staff would be achieved by the increase of the teaching hours in order to 
save 41,2 millions (Law 4127, 2013). Other cut expenses related to the education 
provision were amounted at 62,1 millions. 
 
On the other hand lifelong learning was legislated though the changes implemented in 
the institutional context for the establishment and operation of the private educational 
institutions (Law 4093, 2012; Law 4111, 2013). The Law 3696 (2008) was abolished in 
order to settle the private colleges as institutions of higher education (Law 4093, 2012). 
These regulations were part of the market empowering plan that was integrated by a 
series of reforms. 
 
In addition the Law 4046 (2012) was complemented by the regulations referred to the 
formation of the basic salary in the private sector. Therefore, for the employees above 
the age of 25 the basic salary was fixed at 586,08 euros, for the employees under the 
age of 25 the basic salary was fixed at 510,95 euros and also the amounts of wage 
increases according to the yeas of previous employment were settled  (Law 4093, 
2012). 
 
Moreover, the employer is obliged to inform the employee for its dismissal from 1 to 4 
months period before, depending on the years of employment (Law 4093, 2012). In any 
other case, the employer is enforced to pay the redundancy compensation, which is also 
calculated according to the years of employment and varies from 1 to 12 salaries (Law 
4093, 2012). The overtime is considered as part of the regular working hours if does not 
exceeds two hours per day and 120 hours per year (Law 4093,2012).  
 
In addition, the Law 4093 (2012) introduced legislative intervention to remove the 
restrictions that still exist in the professions of auditors, consultants and accountants, 
temporary employment agencies, real estate agents, actuaries, tourist guides, dockers, 
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private providers of primary health services, customs agents, owners of kiosks and 
canteens in public spaces, tourist agencies, primary and secondary private schools, 
foreign language schools, vocational training institutes, post secondary education 
training centers and press distribution agencies. 
 
As far concerns trade the minimum space requirement to permit the sale of food was 
repealed. General stores were allowed to sell other products apart from food subject to 
sanitary conditions. Supermarkets were also allowed to sell prepackaged meat, cheese 
and fish products for infants. The markets working hours for the employees, as defined 
in Law 1037 (1971), were detached from the operating hours of the businesses. The 
"breaking" of the shift is allowed for all retail outlets, including those operating in 
continuous time. The transport of perishable goods in public use trucks agreed to be 
operated under the same conditions with trucks of private use (Law 4093, 2012). 
 
Tickets of OASA-Athens Urban Transport Organization and OSE TRAINOSE- 
Company of Railway Services Provision were increased to 25% (Law 4093, 2012). 
DEI- Public Provision of Electricity tariffs were to be increased as well in the beginning 
of 2013, excepting merely the vulnerable social groups. The salaries of DEI were 
planned to be reduced, as the Greek government had to compare the total compensation 
of DEI- Public Provision of Electricity employees with 'best practices' of other 
European companies producing and distributing electricity. The changes promoted in 
OASA, OSE and PPC were part of a program for the restructuring of DEKO- Public 
Companies for Common Wealth, of 132 millions total value (Law 4127, 2013). 
 
All these done, Greek government would conduct a plan for the restructuring of DEI- 
Public Provision of Electricity intending to prepare PPC for its privatization and to 
make it competitive compared to other companies in the deregulated electricity market 
(Law 4093, 2012). The target for privatizations was revised at 25 billions introducing in 
the program the states properties in the area of Elliniko and Marousi (law 4093, 2012). 
Moreover the Program of Public investments would be 300 millions reduced, and 
stabilized at 6,8 billions for 2013 (Law 4127, 2013). 
 
Another major sector in the revenue side is the tax reforms. Therefore, according to the 
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Law 4172 (2013), the taxation of the self-employed (freelancers and sole 
proprietorship) increased by revising the tax rate and the criteria that form the taxation. 
Moreover, the tax base broadened by removing tax deductions of mortgage interest, 
house rents and insurance premiums (Law, 4172, 2013). The scale in the income tax 
(38%, 40% and 45%) was abolished and substituted by a unitary weight of 35% (Law, 
4172, 2013).The solidarity levy was customized and extended until 2018 (Law, 4172, 
2013). It was also agreed to form a single tax rate for corporate profits at 35% in order 
to be aligned with the maximum tax rate of the individuals income tax bracket (Law, 
4172, 2013). The overall tax system reform was expected to collect about 23 millions 
for 2013 and another 825 millions until 2015 (Law 4127, 2013). 
 
The presumptive taxation of farmers was repealed and replaced by a single income tax 
rate of 6% on the actual income verified by the account books and records (Law 4172, 
2013).  The reduction in the tax refunds and in the subsidies of petrol’s excise duty of 
the farmers would save 152,1 and 129,5 millions, respectively (Law 4127, 2013). About 
237 millions would be gained from the increase of the tax on deposits’ interest from 
10% to 15% (Law 4127, 2013). 
 
Other measures that targeted to increase revenues by tax implementation are the fee for 
the legal action that aimed to collect a 50 millions annually, the rise in tobacco excise 
duty saving at the same time 186 millions (Law 4127, 2013). Moreover the reform in 
the ships’ taxation according to their capacity would generate some 80 millions (Law 
4127, 2013).  
 
The greater reforms derived from the third memorandum are related to the changes in 
the legislative context that ensures the permanence of employment in the public sector. 
The commitment of the Greek government to minimize the public sector in order to 
become more flexible and efficient required the dismissal of 150.000 public servants by 
2015 (Law 4093, 2012). These numbers would arise from the public personnel’s 
retirements and closure of inefficient or damaging public corporations and bodies.  
 
In the later case the staff of the closed down public services would be introduced into a 
program of ‘labor mobility’ that affects 2000 employees in 2012 and another 25.000 in 
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2013 (Law 4093, 2012; Law 4127, 2012; Law 4172, 2012). The program involves the 
labor’s reserve for maximum one year until another position in the public sector would 
be available, receiving at that time the 60% of the wage (Law 4093, 2012; Law 4127, 
2012; Law 4172, 2012). In any other case the employment would be automatically 
dismissed (Law 4093, 2012; Law 4127, 2012; Law 4172, 2012). 
3.4	  A	  synopsis	  of	  the	  four-­‐years	  austerity	  measures	  
 
In this section will be examined how the austerity measures that derived from the 
memoranda’s legislation were reflected in the annual general government’s balance 
sheets. In this sense, there will be a comparison between the planned performance and 
the occurred one by featuring the revenue and the expenditure accounts, their 
shortcomings and the cases that exceeded the targets. Linking the performance with the 
measures set will assess this effort.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the first memorandum and the succeeded 
legislation set upward revised targets related to the revenues and limitations in the 
expenses of the state budget. However, for a series of reasons -referred to 
underestimating the dynamics of the Greek grey economy and fiscal multipliers, 
domestic and foreign political unwillingness and incompetence- targets considered 
being incompatible with the Greek reality. As already mentioned, another two 
memoranda followed, with collateral measures, in order to revise the deviations from 
the original program.  
 
The annual targets and attainments as described in the state budgets and reports are 
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I.	  REVENUES	   58382	   53956	   92.42%	   59482	   55263	   92.91%	   56159	   52393	   93.29%	   51458	   51863	   100.79%	  
1.	  REGULAR	  
BUDGET	  NET	  




PROGRAM	   3258	   3100	   95.15%	   3922	   3773	   96.20%	   4750	   4687	   98.67%	   5136	   5136	   100.00%	  
II.EXPENSES	   81010	   77381	   104.69%	   80399	   77885	  
103.23
%	   70297	   68705	  
102.32
%	   62652	   60307	   103.89%	  
1.	  REGULAR	  
BUDGET	  
EXPENSES	   71810	   69098	   103.92%	   71839	   71442	  
100.56
%	   62997	   61855	  
101.85
%	   55802	   53457	   104.39%	  
2.	  PUBLIC	  
INVESTMENTS	  
PROGRAM	   9200	   8283	   111.07%	   8500	   6443	  
131.93
%	   7300	   6850	  
106.57
%	   6850	   6850	   100.00%	  
III.	  BALANCE	  
OF	  STATE	  
BUDGET	   -­‐18691	   -­‐23425	   79.79%	   -­‐20857	   -­‐22622	   92.20%	   -­‐14138	   -­‐16312	   86.67%	   -­‐11194	   -­‐8444	   132.57%	  
%	  GDP	   -­‐8%	  
-­‐
10.30




GDP	   231000	  
22731




Table 4: Comparison between 2010-2013 budgets 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2012a; 2012b) 
 
The   budget of the year 2010 was conducted before the implementation of the package 
of the austerity measures that were required for the finance agreement between the 
Greek government and Troika. However, the budget of the year 2010 that was 
confirmed on December of 2009 was completely circumvented by the implementation 
of the bailout program and its macroeconomic context (OEE, 2010). Moreover a revised 
budget in compliance with the emerged economic milieu was never structured, as it 
should be according to the Law 2362 (1995) (OEE, 2010).  
 
The first memorandum aimed to generate a favorable economic milieu for starting up 
and developing entrepreneurial activities, drawing investments and promoting exports 
(Preliminary Draft of 2011 Budget, 2010). Moreover the program targeted at the 
absorption of EU structural funds, reform of public procurement and public supply, 
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employment enhancement though the provision of incentives, market liberalization and 
rationalization of the public bodies function (Preliminary Draft of 2011 Budget, 2010). 
These targets were formed in the revision of the 2010 budget upgrading the initial plan. 
However, it was more than certain that the negative conditions of the Greek economy 
would not assist achieving the over-optimistic targets that were already set by the initial 
budget forecast (TEE, 2010).  
 
The performance of the implemented measures is depicted in the figures bellow. 
 
Graph 5: Amount of revenues and expenses measures, forecasted and performed 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2010) 
 
 
Graph 6: Measures performance on revenues 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2010) 
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Graph 7: Measures performance on expenses 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2010) 
 
The direct taxes underachieved creating a gap in the revenues that was partly covered 
by the raise of the indirect taxes. Therefore, the expansion of the direct taxes’ 
coefficient did not have a positive linear effect on the revenues. The reduction of the 
economic activities caused by the pro-cyclical policies implemented restrained the 
income levels that did not managed to achieve the direct taxes’ targets (OEE, 2011). 
 
In the expenditure side of the regular 2010 budget, salaries and pensions that are 
considered as inelastic spending held the greater part. The bigger reduction in the public 
expenses was executed in the sector of the social provision while the expenses related to 
the interests payment increased by 8% compared to 2009 (OEE, 2011). 
 
As far concerns Public Investment Program, great reductions compared to former years 
were also occurred. Although, spending in this sector is assumed to create a counter-
cyclical trajectory that may put the economy on a possible development plan 
(Maraveyas, 2013). The cuts in the Public Expenditure Program enhanced the recession 
pattern and contributed in the reduction of GDP further than the one forecasted. 
However, according to IMF’s Third Review On Stand-By Arrangement (2011a) the 
annual 2010 budget that was formed according to the implemented economic program 
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delays, tax mechanisms inefficiencies and privatizations underachievement (IMF, 
2011a). 
 
The performance of the 2011 Greek economy was based on the reforms of the first 
memorandum and the revision of the economic targets as been declared in the mid-term 
plan of 2011 summer. 2011 economic plan was implemented in a context of severe 
recession. Therefore, as been mentioned in the fifth report of IMF about the Greek 
economy’s performance (2011b) audits in revenues that come from large taxpayers and 
high-wealth individuals have fallen behind schedule. Also, reforms for removing 
barriers in order to make effective the tax administration were also behind schedule. 
The revenues from direct tax collection were reduced compared to 2010 attainments and 
2011 forecast. The expansion of the tax base and the changes in the taxation criteria for 
the freelancers predicted an increase in the revenues of income taxes that was not 
eventually accomplished. On the other hand the direct taxes on property exceeded the 
set targets due to the implementation of the emergent tax through DEI bills (Ministry of 
Finance, 2012b)  
 
 Indirect taxes were also underachieved by 12.97%, which is attributed to VAT, 
transaction taxes, indirect consumption taxes and custom taxes (Ministry of Finance, 
2012b). On the contrary, non-tax revenues increased over the forecast’s targets due to 
including revenues from the forfeiture of guarantees in the budget, the sale of non-listed 
companies, the assigning of licenses and royalties of the public sector, the reserve of the 
Deposit Fund inclusion and the ”Response To The Financial Crisis” project (Ministry of 
Finance, 2012b). 
 
Public Investments Program revenues were 3.8% increased. European Funds were the 
main funding sources of the program while the credit revenues were 74.22 % decreased 
compared to the forecast (Ministry of Finance, 2012b). The expenses of the regular 
budget diverged from the initial target by 19%, which is attributed to the increase of the 
loans service expenses (Ministry of Finance, 2012b).  
 
Moreover, according to IMF’s fifth report (IMF, 2011b) the privatization plans were 
advancing, but sales have been slow to materialize and the promoted structural reforms 
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have not yet delivered the expected results, in part due to a disconnect between 
legislation and implementation. The latter is evident in issues related to  
o Collective bargaining  
o Liberalizing restricted professions 
o Fast-track investment procedure (IMF, 2011b) 
However the deficit behaved better than in the last year but still diverging from the 
initial target. 
The budget of 2012 was revised according to the new memorandum on February 2012. 
The revenues forecasted to be less compared to the previous years budget expectations 
and the expenses were restrained even more. In addition, the overall balance would be 
increased and the primary as well. Moreover the Organizations of Social Insurance were 
expected to have a deficit in their accounts due to the limited revenues they were about 
to receive (Ministry of Finance, 2012a).  
In more details the revenues received are bellow the total of revenues planned due to the 
recession that was greater than forecasted. The revenues from direct taxation were 
increased mainly because of the real estate taxation (Ministry of Finance, 2012a).  The 
deviations from the targets observed are the outcomes of the extension of the period that 
tax declarations were submitted (Ministry of Finance, 2012a). Indirect tax revenues fell 
under the targets as also non-regular revenues did due to the transaction of public 
property to TAIPED (Ministry of Finance, 2012a). 
 
The expenses of the regular budget decreased due to the reduction of the defense 
expenses and the payments to health care institutions (Ministry of Finance, 2012a). 
Moreover primary expenses were also decreased due to the reduction of the labor cost 
in the public sector (Ministry of Finance, 2012a).  
 
The so far published data in the July’s 2013 newsletter of the budget execution provide 
that the process of revenues collection and expenses is close to the forecasted targets 
and may succeed even better performance by the end of the year (Ministry of Finance, 
2013).  However, according to a current report of IMF (IMF, 2013a) the overall 
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financial arrangement is subject to many failures as the value of fiscal multipliers was 
initially underestimated. This led to later revisions that quadrupled them. Actually, as 
been stated in the 2012 World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2012) “the fiscal multipliers 
tend to be higher when household are liquidity constrained and monetary policy cannot 
provide any offset”.  
 
Moreover the position of IMF is empowered by the conviction that the divergence from 
the targets set is the outcome of delays and deviations in the implementation process 
from the program requirements as in the case of public servants’ dismissals and 
privatizations (IMF, 2012 October). However, there is another position that assumes 
that the failures of the economic program promoted by Troika and agreed by the Greek 
government has inherent inefficiencies as it is based in pro-cyclical economic policies 
that deepen the recession. A significant example of this point is the cut provoked in the 
Public Investments Program, which is a main factor in the GDP function. Moreover, 
Public Investments Program receives even greater importance in times of economic 
crisis since it boost the weak economic activity. In addition the failures in the program 
of privatizations is attributed to the negative economic milieu, which derives by the 
unstable economic position of Greece due to the ever growing huge debt as a ratio to 
GDP and the fiscal adjustment mechanism that implements a series of austerity 
measures (Holland & Portes, 2012; Krugman, 2012b).  
 
All different approaches about the deepening of the economic crisis convert to the point 
that the basic problem of the Greek economy is the weak productive base. Moreover, it 
is also argued that the reconstruction of the Greek production system was never part of 
Troika’s economic program or constrained annual budgets since they used to follow a 
top-down approach rather than composing it with the requirements of a bottom-up one 
(OEE, 2010).  
 
Therefore, it is crucial before proceeding in the section that analyzes the impact of the 
implemented to have an overall glance at the program trajectory. The deviations from 
the verified revenues of the yearly budget are 7% on average bellow the implemented 
targets. The loss derived from the revenues failures is replaced by the further cut in the 
state expenses, which are constantly overachieved. However, in the verified annual 
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reports on the state budget, the divergence in the balance is always greater than the 
shortcoming of the revenues. On the contrary, according to the last published report on 
2013 state budget, the revenues and the expenses recorded converge to the ones 
forecasted while state balance rises well above to the one predicted.  
 
 
Graph 8: Deviations of the verified data from the planned ones 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2013) 
 
Another crucial comparison directly related to the implemented measures derived from 
the economic memoranda is the one between depicted in the following figure between 
the total amount of the austerity measures and the state deficit. As it seems in the last 
three years, as confirmed by the annual reports, the state deficit is constrained. 
Moreover, it is observed a common tendency between the balance of the state and the 
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Graph 9: Comparison between measures and deficit  
Source IMF (2013a) 
 
Additionally, the deficit reduction provoked by the economic programs’ requirements 
came along with the reduction of the Greek GDP signifying that although the 
implementation of the austerity measures was frontloaded the decline of GDP became 
more intense in recently. 
 
 
Graph 10: Comparison between measures and GDP 
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3.	  Gauging	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  memoranda	  in	  a	  macro-­‐economic	  
context.	  
 
The economic crisis burst in the US real estate sector, due to the provision of high 
risked mortgages, was initially assumed to be constrained in US economy and the 
economies were linked to it. However, the great instability caused in the financial 
markets, unleashed the profit seeking market actions. Suddenly, investors who were 
thankful for purchasing  “Greek debt at more or less the same yield as that of Germany 
and other countries demanded substantially higher interest rates to hold Greek 
government bonds” (Theodoropoulou & Watt, 2011). As well, banks adopt the same 
behavior and acted as investors that “rushed to dump Greek assets, threatening the 
banking system, not only in Greece but also Europe-wide, with a renewed crash” 
(Theodoropoulou & Watt, 2011). 
 
Therefore, the increasing transaction of CDS led to an unsustainable debt, which was 
over 100% of GDP for the last twenty years (Christodoulakis, 2011) that forced a 
sudden turnaround from stimulus to austerity in the spring of 2010 (Theodoropoulou & 
Watt, 2011). Issues relevant to European delay and unwillingness, Greek incapacity and 
long-run structural inefficiencies in the economy and administration, and the inherent 
attributes of European architecture conclude to the first memorandum between the 
Greek government and the EU, ECB and IMF, also known as Troika.  
 
In this chapter will be discussed the effects in the Greek economy in the post-2010 
period, derived from the implied austerity measures of fiscal consolidation and 
structural reforms in the Greek economy. The measures taken were part of a very strict 
program that decided by the EU, ECB and IMF and agreed by the Greek government in 
three memoranda so far. These programs are blamed for following a pro-cyclical rather 
than counter-cyclical trajectory in the economy. Therefore, this approach is fundamental 
in order to understand the reasons that deepened recession in Greece. It is also a crucial 
assessment for further research on the possible policy responses to combat recession 
and find a way out. 
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3.1	  The	  Greek	  deficit	  and	  debt.	  
 
As it is already discussed the crisis in the Greek economy burst after the dispute of 
Greek Statistical Authority on the validity of deficit measures, on October of 2009. 
Soon after the revision of the economic data revealed that the deficit was significantly 
higher than was initially premised. Namely, the revision proved that the deficit was 
15.4% of GDP instead of 13.6%. This increase was in line with some 36.15 million that 
derive from taking into account the deficit of the public corporations, the adjustment of 
the accounts of Local Administration and Social Insurance Organizations and the 
reduction of 2009 GDP.  
 
The modification of the deficit concluded to the revision of the government’s debt as 
well. Therefore, the debt was increased to 298 billions or 126.8% of GDP. This 
signified a 11,4% increase compared to the 115,4% that was originally estimated. The 
magnitude of the deficit, which was accompanied by a huge debt made the burden of 
the Greek economy no longer viable. In the neo-classical economics the deficit and the 
debt reflect the state of economic instability (Tsakalotos, 2010) that were actually over 
the threshold of 3% and 120%, respectively. Thereafter the markets speculations put 
pressure on Greek bonds and incited issues related to Greek liability on debt service 
(Stathakis, 2010).  
 
Therefore, it is crucial for the present assessment to examine the way deficit and debt, 
as the substantial accounts of the economy, behaved under the stretch of the rescue 
packages’ implementation. The Greek economy along with the intertemporal 
inefficiencies, underwent the paradox of the insistent excessive deficit and debt albeit 
the implementation of a series of contractive fiscal adjustment programs since the 
accession in the Euro area (Stathakis, 2010).  
 
In brief, the stabilization programs of 1985-87, 1990-93, 1996-2000 and 2005-2007 
never managed to counter the root causes of macroeconomic imbalances and inclined 
steadily to the 2009 outburst.   
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Graph 11: Evolution of the Greek debt and deficit until the time of the crisis 
Source: Ameco  
 
Apart from the short period that coincided with the joining in the Eurozone and the 
post-Olympic Games period, the tendency of the deficit was always following the ever-
growing trajectory of the debt. In order to understand the behavior of the 
macroeconomic accounts, with respect to the measures of austerity that were set in the 
post 2009 period, it is mandatory to decompose the structure of debt and deficit and 
analyze their interdependencies.  
 
The basic macroeconomic definition for the debt of a country involves all of the public 
sector liabilities including all levels of government of a state: government, regions, 
municipalities etc. The extraordinary high levels of Greek debt tried to be limited by the 
first rescue pack confirmed by the Greek parliament on May 2010. The initial plan of 
the Greek debt progress is spotted in the following figure, which is demonstrated in the 
First Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement (IMF, 2010). The baseline represents 
the initial expectations adjusting its trajectory in case unplanned events occurred.   
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Graph 12: Public Debt Sustainability Analysis-a (in percent of GDP) 
Source: IMF (2010)  
 
However the initial expectations about the trajectory of the Greek debt were revised 
upward in the Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-By 
Arrangement (IMF, 2013a). 
 
 
Graph 13:Public Debt Sustainability Analysis-b (in percent of GDP) 
Source: IMF (2013b) 
 
On the contrary, the Greek public debt as an absolute number reflects a steeper 
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trajectory in the turning point of the curve, as it seems in the figure bellow. 
 
Graph 14: Debt in absolute terms 
Source: PDMA (2013) 
 
This is due to the 2012 PSI of 50% in the Greek bonds that was agreed in the European 
Summit in October of 2011. The impact expected initially was counted at about 100 
billion since the loans from Greece’s financial partners, bonds holding by ECB, 
Treasury Bills and Securitized loans –the official sector- were excluded from the deal. 
However, the haircut provided severe costs that had to be compensated through the 
recapitalization of the banking sector and Insurance Funds and remittance for the losses 
in the Bank of Greece and in various insurance corporations (SEV, 2011). Albeit the 
Greek PSI reduced the Greek debt by 87 billion (Ministry of Finance, 2012), there was 
a vivid discussion about the inadequate outcomes of that option of debt operation.  
 
First of all the PSI failed to achieve the initial target of 100 billion debt reduction. This 
is maybe due to mis-estimations in the amount of bonds held in the banking sector, 
which after the first announcemnt for a Greek PSI in 2011 summer made a haste to buy 
Greek bonds sold at 30% of their nominal price (Varoufakis, 2012)1. Moreover, 
excluding the debt of the official sector, the debt haircut had very little to contribute in 
making the Greek debt sustainable, since it could not reach levels under 120% of GDP. 
Therefore, an OSI is suggested as a more viable solution towards debt sustainability 
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eurobonds could surpass all kinds of shortcoming derived from such an operation, but 
Germany would not let this happen (Varoufakis, 2012) 
 
Furthermore, the PSI did not manage to restore credibility (see figure bellow) in the 
Greek economy. On the contrary, it provoked a circle of increased anxiety for further 
instability and low trustworthiness that discourage investment. This fact is also verified 
in the high interest rates, that despite their reduction, they remain in high levels  
(Ministry of Finance, 2012) that imply fears of a possible default.  
 
Graph 15: Greek credibility 
Source: European Commission (2013) 
 
The composition of Greek public debt at the moment is heavily relied on EFSF loans 
and treasury bills according to data derived from the Public Debt Management Agency 
(PDMA, 2013). Although the greater part of the debt is obtained in euros, it is 
considered as foreign debt. This fact implies that in case of absence of inherent 
asymmetries in the architecture of the monetary union, the magnitude of Greek debt 
crisis could be constrained to some level. 
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Graph 16: Debt composition by instrument 
Source: PDMA (2013) 
 
Debt composition by currency 
 
Graph 17: Debt composition by currency 
Source: PDMA (2013) 
 
The progress of the debt reduction is depending on the progress of the deficit. 
Therefore, the permanent positive rates of Greek deficit forced the debt, as expected, in 
incredible high levels.  This trajectory assumed to be interrupted by the implementation 
of a program of fiscal and economic consolidation in order to make the Greekdeficit 
constrained and the Greek debt viable. The main identity of public deficit implies that 
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The contractionary economic policy followed targeted primarily in limiting the centrals 
government’s deficit, suppressing budget and current account deficit. This policy 
temporarily would increase Greece’s foreign debt due to the loans received but as 
mentioned before, in the mid-term the debt was expected to be sustainable. The debt 
would return to the previous levels after the stabilization of the deficit and restore the 
national credibility in order to be likely for Greece to borrow from the markets without 
Troika’s support. 
 
Debt increase rebutted the initial projections, due to matters related to the greater 
recession than expected, which will be analyzed later. However, the deficit progressed 
closer to the original targets without having great revisions in the original forecast. Yet, 
after 2011 the deficit declined in a higher pace than expected.  
 
Graph 18: Public Deficit Sustainability Analysis (in percent of GDP) 
Source: IMF (2013a) 
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Graph 19: Deficit as % of GDP 
Source: PDMA, (2013) 
 
The deficit of the state annual budget, compromised the lack of growth, as reflected in 
the collection of revenue, simply by expanding the cuts in the public expenses in order 
to remain in the context of the targets set. This act was inevitable, since the 
accomplishment of the Troika’s requirements about the level of the budget deficit were 
indisputable as they occured the pre-conditions for the disbursement of the loans 
payments.  
 
Therefore, the austerity measures implemented did not manage to meet the problem of 
Greek budget deficit that is summarized in the stagnation of revenues (Tsakalotos, 
2010) but assisted in preserving the problem by setting inflexible quantitative targets. 
This fact sets under question the sustainability in the revenue-less reduction of the 
deficit. 
 
According to N. Roubini (2004) the solvency of one state’s economy is depending on 
the size of the deficit compared to GDP and whether the reduction occurred due to the 
public investment cuts or not. Hence, it is preferable to preserve a deficit that finances 
long-run domestic investment because it construct a solid base for national productive 
capacity and also enhances its competence to service the debt in future times (Roubini, 
2004).  The cuts in the Public Investment Program were severe in absolute terms but as 
a GDP ratio had smoother adjustments remaining in inversely proportional to the 
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negative growth rates. 
 
 
Graph 20: Public investment in absolute terms 




Graph 21: Public investment as a% of GDP 








2010	   2011	   2012	  
PUBLIC	  INVESTMENTS	  PROGRAM	  
PUBLIC	  INVESTMENTS	  PROGRAM	  
2.80%	  2.90%	  3.00%	  
3.10%	  3.20%	  3.30%	  
3.40%	  3.50%	  3.60%	  
3.70%	  
2010	   2011	   2012	  
PUBLIC	  INVESTMENTS	  PROGRAM	  
as	  %	  of	  GDP	  
PUBLIC	  INVESTMENTS	  PROGRAM	  
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 11:51:53 EET - 137.108.70.7
Myrto Roza Tourtouri                                          An Evaluation of the Greek Austerity Programs                                                                                     
                               
	   48 
 
Graph 22: public investment compared to recession 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2012b) 
 
Frieden et al (1998) suggest that the combination of mild monetary relaxation with a tax 
rate hike is the optimum option for a sustainable deficit reduction if an absolute 
monetary relaxation or unsustainable degrowth of opponent economies are not an 
option. Coenen et al (2012b) state that if the burden of the deficit service is transferred 
to household through tax increase will have a more modest effect on the output. 
However, this should be planned under the estimation of Laffer curve effect. This 
means, that if tax revenues are not adequate, maybe a tax rate increase is not the 
solution.  
 
Indeed, as been several times mentioned, there is a severe Greek incapacity in the 
collection of tax and in the construction of a solid tax system. Until the time of writing, 
tax administration is incapable of confirming and clearing more than 15% of tax 
declaration, bringing additional delays in the revenues collection. Additionally the 
Greek grey economy of one year is estimating on dozens of billion. Consequently, 
maybe a more viable solution for deficit decline is the reform of taxation and public 
administration system than implementing multiple times higher tax rates.  
 
Another issue of interest in the discussion of deficit reduction is the study of the current 
account balance. The current account balance indicates whether an economy is in deficit 
or in surplus by estimating the trade balance in goods, services or latent economic 
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flows. The deficit in these accounts is balanced by burden the financial account balance 
(Polito & Wickens, 2013).  
 
 
Graph 23: Current account balance 
Source: IMF (2013a) 
 
The austerity measures through the policy of deflation and domestic devaluation tries to 
narrow the domestic demand that affects the trade balance. The intertemporal Greek 
trade deficit contributed in the debt and was increase by foreign financial inflows since 
the domestic savings were inadequate to cover the internal needs for consumption and 
investment. The several projections about the progress of the current account balance 
were more pessimistic than the rates accomplished. However, the over achievement of 
the targets may derives from the great reduction in the imports rather than an adequate 
increase in exports.  
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Graph 24: Current account balance revisions 
Source: IMF (2013a) 
 
 
Graph 25: Trade balance 
Source: IMF (2013b) 
 
This fact is mainly attributed to the limited competitiveness of the Greek economy 
albeit the great reductions in wages and labor cost in general. The negative economic 
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milieu provided by the permanent discussion about a possible Grexit or the need of 
another haircut enhanced the sense of economic instability. Moreover, as the capital and 
financial balance ought to offset the deficit in the current account, it should be studied 
the potential of the former account. CFB is parted from the direct investment, the 
portfolio investment and the reserve assets 
 
The drawing of FDI was well bellow an adequate level since the progress of 
privatizations and profession liberalization was excessively discouraging. 
 
Graph 26: Revisions of privatizations program 
Source: IMF (2013a) 
 
Therefore, the deficit was compensated by the transaction of bond and other equities 
titles. Eventually the forecast for the current account is to meet positive levels after 
2013. 
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Graph 27: Current account forecast 
Source, IMF (2013b) 
3.2	  GDP	  and	  Employment	  
 
The gross domestic product (or GDP) is the sum of all products and goods produced 
within an economy, expressed in monetary units. In other words, GDP represents the 
total value of all final goods (tangible and intangible) produced within a country in one 
year. However, austerity is clearly contractionary in bad economic times by means that 
reflect in GDP performance. Effectiveness of consolidation measures is diminished at 
present as it significantly aggravates the impact in terms of average output declines 
(Holland & Portes, 2012).  
 
The progress of GDP is crucial for the performance of the Greek economy as it 
represents the most significant national account (Katsibris, 1999). In terms of expenses 
the GDP function is equal to the total sum of the private consumption expenses, the 
gross investment expenses (public and private), public consumption expenses and net 
exports of goods and services. These expenses reflect the overall amount of national 
annual expenses. The hysteresis in these accounts was provoked by the implementation 
of the packages of fiscal tightening that suppressed them resulting in negative growth 
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rates.  
 
IMF (2013a) embraces that the initial counting of fiscal multipliers on the austerity 
measures was underestimated. This fact led to greater rates of recession and constraint 
GDP more than originally meant to be.  Van Reenen (2013) notes that in times of 
economic imbalances fiscal multipliers are much higher than in normal times and 
contraction provides to be quite damaging in such cases. Moreover, according to Aslund 
(2013) “there is a habitual tendency of fund programs to be over-optimistic on growth 
until economy reaches on bottom and thereafter to underestimate the recovery”. 
Therefore, this tendency is evident in the constant revisions of Troika’s foresightedness 
due to the unrealistic estimations of fiscal multipliers on spending cuts and tax increases 
(Papadimitriou et al, 2013).  
 
Graph 28: Real GDP (2005=100) 
Source: Papadimitriou et al (2013) 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 11:51:53 EET - 137.108.70.7
Myrto Roza Tourtouri                                          An Evaluation of the Greek Austerity Programs                                                                                     
                               
	   54 
 
Graph 29: Real GDP Growth Rate 
Source: Papadimitriou et al (2013) 
 
 
In this context, Coenen et al (2012b) advocate that there are complementarities between 
public and private investment that signifies the existence of greater multipliers effect in 
the public cuts. The multipliers on investment tend to have stronger effects on the long 
run.  On the contrary, Coenen et al (2012b) detect that the multipliers between public 
and private consumption tend to diminish in time. This points out that an adjustment in 
government investment signals an equivalent response of private sector obtaining 
obvious results in the growth rates and in the GDP performance as in the case of Greek 
economy. 
 
Moreover, no incentive for investment exists in an economy subject to IMF financial 
mechanism that no government can independently exercise bilateral agreements of any 
kind (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 2011). This means that the multipliers on public 
investment affect in part the investment in the private sector. The latter, is 
simultaneously subject to matters related to the business environment and to the 
progress of structural reforms. This is why, IMF although the acknowledgement about 
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multipliers underestimation, insists that the continuous failing in GDP performance 
projections is rather due to the inefficiencies and delays in the structural reforms 
required. Actually, it is difficult to distinguish in which level fiscal multipliers or lack of 
structural reforms reinforced the shortcomings in the expected growth rates.  
 
In addition the private consumption is quite restrained albeit the linkage with the public 
consumption cuts is proved to be weak (Coenen et al, 2012b). At this point the 
Permanent Income Hypothesis (Friedman, 1957) don’t seem to be confirmed since the 
intensity of consolidation through the wages devaluation and the tremendous tax 
increase, reduced more than 30% the income constraint.  In addition, the limited 
confidence and the expectation for the economy to get worse suppress even more the 
consumption. 
 
As far concerns gross exports, as a component of GDP, there is a little pick mainly 
attributed to tourism (IMF, 2013b). However, the expected performance in the export 
sector couldn’t be achieved although the severe programs of domestic devaluation that 
were implemented in order to enhance the competitiveness (Weisbrot & Modecino, 
2012). Furthermore, no program of domestic deflation cannot be successful, regarding 
the growth performance restoration, as long as the same policy is obtained by all trade 
partners (Van Reenen, 2013). This means that domestic devaluation in Greece has no 
gains if not accompanied by domestic revaluation in trade partners economies (De 
Grauwe &Yuemei, 2013).  
 
 
Graph 30: Real Growth Rate of Exports 
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Source: Papadimitriou et al (2013) 
 
Albeit the shortcomings in all factors of GDP, the IMF expectations are positive 
regarding the future GDP progress and its contributions (IMF, 2013). However, the 
constant incapacity of Troika to make projections that converge to the actual 
achievements tends to bring into question the validity of IMF’s claims on GDP.  
 
 
Graph 31: Contributions to GDP progress 
Source: IMF (2013b) 
 
The so far GDP performance signifies a continuous fall in employment since the former 
cannot grow fast enough in order to arrest a downward turn in labor market providing at 
the same time the highest level of unemployment in the industrialized world 
(Papadimitriou et al, 2013). According to the heterodox notion unemployment 
demonstrates a successful capitalistic economy (Varoufakis, 2007) since it works as a 
“redistributive” tool in periods of economic crisis (Moutos & Tsitsikas, 2010). However 
the pre-crisis rates of unemployment cannot be explained as an outcome of capitalism’s 
success in Greece. Rather the opposite. Since 90’s the time unemployment started to 
rise, coincided with lower than before growth rates (Moutos & Pechlivanos, 2013) that 
signifies weak economic performance and lower rates of accumulation. 
 
The Greek unemployment, which was intertemporally beyond European average, was 
mainly reinforced by the structural inefficiencies in the Greek economy. The causality 
of this phenomenon is heavily attributed to the lack of adaptation in the adjustments 
provoked in the nature of the labor market and to the inflexibility that could not ease the 
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clearance in the labor market (Borjas, 2003). Indeed the Greek welfare state was 
fragmented with special profession and employees (Stathakis, 2010) that provided 
stiffness in the labor market similar to the one of the post-socialists economies. Other 
similarities between the Greek and NMS’s labor market are found in the way the 
production structure proved to be inefficient in the single market’s competition and 
raised unemployment (Kalioras et al, 2008).  
 
The lack of competition exhibits an internal asymmetry in the way the EU integrated. 
The limited labor mobility, compared to the US could not reverse the ever-growing 
tendency of unemployment. Therefore, the program of internal devaluation was 
expected to reinforce the competitiveness through the suppression of wages and prices, 
as already mentioned before. However the persistency of unemployment implies that 
the competitiveness may depends stronger to other factors than labor cost. In that way 
the pro-cyclical policies for competitiveness enhancement reinforced recession 
providing even more unemployment. 
 
 
Graph 32: Unemployment rate 
Source: Papadimitriou et al (2013) 
 
By all means, labor market was subject to very violent changes, regarding to the 
implementations of laws (Law 3986, 2011) that diminished wages, abolished 
allowances, increased working time, and eased dismissals. The former institutional 
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context of Greece although was quite protective, however was constantly biased. 
Therefore, after the collapse of all the previous firewalls, major potentials emerged for 
decreasing unemployment. The market could supply labor in much lower cost, 
regarding basic salary, dismissal facilitation, cuts in insurance cost, and also part of 
undeclared labor (such as overtime work) became legal pushing grey economy into 
some limits.  
 
However, the undeclared labor tended to increase, which is interpreted in tax and 
insurance looses up to 3.35 billion for 2013 (INE-GSEE, 2013), and unemployment 
increase, which also provokes great costs for economy and for the expected recovery. 
On the other hand unemployment itself could not be diminished due to the lack of a 
coherent pattern of strong growth that would create demand and generate labor supply 
(Weisbrot & Modecino, 2013). 
 
 
Graph 33: The evolution of the undeclared labor and unemployment in 2010-2013 period 
Source: INE-GSEE (2013) 
 
It is worth saying that the unemployment has been more severe in the regions that were 
more industrialized and concentrated most of the economic activities of the country 
(INE-GSEE, 2013). This signifies that the kind of economic activity that sustains is 
related to low specialization, mostly in the primary sector and in tourism. Moreover, the 
excessive young unemployment lays in the fact that the high-qualified human capital is 
without work subject. This fact along with the great detachment between education and 
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production, one of the constant milestones in labor markets inefficiencies, consist of the 
main factors of young unemployment.  
 
 
However, the policy for employment enhancement could not deal with that successful 
and only the existence of family networks and the expansion of mini-jobs make the 
young unemployment for a little more tolerated (Annunziata, 2013). The deficit in the 
balance between employs and dismissals has a strong persistency that after a pick 
observed in 2012 took a downward turn. However this should be examined in parallel 
with the occurred immigrants flows that are mainly directed toward Germany and other 
European countries. More specifically, according to OECD (2013) data flows were 
about 23 000 to Germany, 6 000 to the United Kingdom, 2 400 to the Netherlands, and 
1 000 to Sweden in 2011. These numbers were increased by 70% for Germany and 40% 
for Sweden for 2012 (OECD, 2013). 
 
 
Graph 34:Flows towards employment and unemployment 
Source: INE-GSEE (2013) 
 
Another crucial element in the discussion about unemployment is the long run 
unemployment that eliminates the gains of the employment balance and the odds for a 
short-term recovery. Long periods of unemployment demolish the existing human 
capital. After all, the more than 1 million lost jobs is a heavily recessionary attribute 
that can lead the economy to a vicious stagnation since the unemployment limitation to 
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less than 10% will need more than 20 years to be accomplished (INE-GSEE). 
3.3	  Structural	  reforms	  
 
The promotion of the structural reforms was a basic requirement in the program of 
fiscal consolidation in order the changes could perform efficiently. As most of the 
targets were underachieved Greek authorities took the blame for not responding to the 
mandatory changes in the way the Greek state functions, regarding matters of closed 
professions, privatizations etc. (Christodoulakis, 2011; IMF, 2013a).  The Greek 
modern state –basically after 1974- along with the Greek economy, were constructed 
based on the principles of unconditional fiscal expansion and a thick institutional 
context, which was characterized by obscurity and overlaps.  
 
However, the most crucial reforms for Troika were to shrink public sector in order to 
become flexible, cheaper, more competitive and efficient. The flagships of this effort 
were reflected in the programs of privatizations, closure of public bodies, abolishment 
of permanency in the public sector and cuts in the public sector’s labor and function 
cost. The derived targets managed to be met in part or with delay while some others are 
still not accomplished. In more details the program of structural reforms, distinguished 
between fiscal and competitive reforms, is exhibited in the table below referring the 
main actions, in chronological order, whether they were met or not or met with delay. 
 
Structural benchmarks Status 
Fiscal action   
1. Reduce public wage bill by cutting bonuses/allowances; and 
pension bonuses (except minimum pensions).  
 
met 
2. Increase standard VAT rate from 21 to 23 percent and reduced 
rate from 10 to 11 percent and excise tax rates on alcohol, 
tobacco, and fuel with a yield of at least €1.25 billion in the 
remainder of 2010. 
 
met 
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3. Appoint staff team and leader in GAO responsible for general 
government in-year cash reporting.  
 
met 
4. Adopt and start to implement a reorganization of sub-central 
government with the aim to reduce the number of local 
administrations and elected/appointed officials (Kalikrates).  
 
met 
5. Submit to parliament amendments to Law 2362/1995 to (i) require 
the MoF to present a three-year fiscal and budget strategy, (ii) 
introduce top down budgeting with expenditure ceilings for the 
State budget and multi-year contingency margins, (iv) require a 
supplementary budget for any overspending above the 
contingency, (v) and introduce commitment controls. The 
amended law should be immediately effective, including in the 
context of the 2011 budget. 
 
met 
6. The National Actuarial Authority to produce a report to assess 
whether the parameters of the new system significantly strengthen 




7. Adopt a comprehensive pension reform that reduces the projected 
increase in public spending on pensions over the period 2010-60 
to 21⁄2 percent of GDP.  
 
met 
8. Establish a commitment register in all line ministries and public 
law entities. Begin publishing monthly data on general 
government in-year fiscal developments (including arrears).  
 
met 
9. Publish 2009 financial statements of the ten largest loss-making 
public enterprises, audited by chartered accountants, on the 
official website of the Ministry of Finance.  
 
met 
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10. Put in place an effective project management arrangement 
(including tight MOF oversight and five specialist taskforces to 
implement the anti-evasion plan to restore tax discipline through: 
strengthened collection funds—of the largest debtors; a 
reorganized large taxpayer unit focused on the compliance of the 
largest revenue contributors; a strong audit enforcement and 
recovery of tax arrears—coordinated with the social security 
program to defeat pervasive evasion by high-wealth individuals 
and high income self-employed, including prosecution of the 




11. Publish a detailed report by the ministry of finance in cooperation 
with the single payment authority on the structure and levels of 





12. Adopt new Regulation of Statistical Obligations for the agencies 




13. Pass legislation to: (i) streamline the administrative tax dispute 
and judicial appeal processes; (ii) remove impediments to the 
exercise of core tax administration functions (e.g. centralized 
filing enforcement and debt collection, indirect audit methods, and 
tax returns processing); and (iii) introduce a more flexible human 
resource management system (including the acceleration of 





14. Appointment of financial accounting officers in all line ministries 
and major general government entities (with the responsibility to 
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15. Publish the medium-term budget strategy paper, lying out time-
bound plans to address: (i) restructuring plans for large and/or 
lossmaking state enterprises; (ii) the closure of unnecessary public 
entities; (iii) tax reform; (iv) reforms ot public administration; (v) 




16. Articulate a strategic plan of medium-term revenue administration 




17. Publish three consecutive months of consistent arrears and 
consolidated general government fiscal reports (excluding small 




18. Adopt the necessary changes to enact the plan to reform the 




19. Parliament to approve medium-term budget strategy (MTFS).  
 
met 
20. Government to legislate key fiscal-structural reforms in an MTFS 
Implementation Bill  
 
met 
21. Government to enact legislation in the context of MTFS 
implementation (phase II) to: (i) introduce pension adjustment bill 
stipulating freezes through 2015, introducing individual social 
security numbers, caps, means testing, and rationalizing benefits 
of pension funds; (ii) introduce single public pay scale bill, 
temporarily freeze automatic progression, and halve productivity 
allowance; and (iii) close 40 small public entities, merge 25 more 
small entities, and close an additional 10 large entities under line 
ministries and in the social security sector 
met with 
delay 
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22. Government to achieve quantitative targets set under its anti-tax 
evasion plan.  
 
n.a. 
23. Government to complete key actions to implement the various 
measures approved in the context of the first MTFS reform bill 
and anticipated in the second set of reforms bills (Annex I), 
including the reform of the public sector wage grid and the 
closure and/or merger of extra- budgetary funds.  
 
n.a. 
24. Government to enact spending reductions (including pensions and 
earmarked spending and advanced removal of the heating fuel 




25. Parliament to approve a tax reform package, including [(i) a 
simplification of the code of Books and Records, (ii) the 
elimination of several tax exemptions and preferential regimes 
under the corporate income tax and the VAT; (iii) simplification 
of the VAT and property tax rate structures; and (iv) a more 
uniform treatment of individual capital income].  
 
n.a. 
26. Government to undertake a thorough review of public expenditure 
programs to identify [3] percent of GDP in additional measures 




Competitiveness reforms   
1. Prepare a privatization plan for the divestment of state assets and 
enterprises with the aim to raise at least 1 billion euro a year 
during the period 2011-2013.  
 
met 
2. Table legislation to reform the system of collective bargaining, met 
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including to eliminate the automatic extension of sectorial 
agreements to those not represented in negotiations, and guarantee 
that firm level agreements take precedence over sectorial 
agreements without undue restrictions.  
 
3. The Council of Ministers to adopt a comprehensive privatization 
plan through 2015.  
 
met 




5. Government to legislatively establish a Privatization Agency (a 
private law vehicle into which privatizable assets will be 
transferred to be sold).  
 
met 
6. Government to (i) shift a second group of assets into the 
privatization fund covering transactions to be completed through 
end-2012 (Annex II); and (ii) appoint legal, technical, and 
financial advisors for 14 projects to be completed by end-2012. 
 
n.a. 
7. Government to enact legislation to (i) allow worker 
representatives to negotiate both special and regular firm-level 
agreements; (ii) suspend the "favorability clause" in wage 
negotiations until at least 2015; and (iii) suspend until at least the 
end of 2014 the possibility to extend sectorial agreements to 
parties not represented in the negotiations.  
 
n.a. 
8. Government to screen specific service sector legislation and 
repeal or modify unnecessary and outdated regulations to ensure 
full consistency with the new law liberalizing all professions and 
income-generating economic activities. 
 
n.a. 
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9. Government to enact legislation to (i) reduce the employers’ share 
of social security contributions, including by rationalizing and 
consolidating small earmarked funds and broadening the base and 
(ii) improve the administration of security contribution 
collections, including by combining collection functions. 
 
n.a. 
Table 5: Structural reforms progress 
Source: IMF (2013a) 
 
With regard to the fiscal reforms only 11/26 were met while 10/26 were met with delay 
and the rest 5 were not accomplished. As far concerns the competitiveness reforms the 
outcomes indicate that 5/9 were met 4/9 were not accomplished. These results do no 
provide a specific profile of the targets were met or met with delay but describe the 
general incapacity of the Greek state to respond to the program properly.  
 
The level of the divergence from the initial goals is multiple times greater then the 
divergence occurred in the budgetary or in the macroeconomic targets (see chapter). In 
this sense there are many who claim that the programs if were implemented as initially 
that would be a sizeable effect in the output (Christodoulakis, 2011, Coenen et al, 
2012a;Coenen et al, 2012b; IMF, 2013a). Moreover, this perspective comprehends 
structural reforms as the basic asset of consolidation programs. Alesina and Giavazz 
(2013) state that the right question is not “how far” austerity measures go but “how” 
they go far enough. 
 
On the other hand, the IMF itself set the question whether the reforms should be 
implemented more gradually and not that frontloaded (IMF, 2013a). Van Reenen (2013) 
assumes that the structural reforms should be implemented in a long-term project 
towards the enhancement of competition and growth. The logic under this assumption 
may lay in the dynamic nature of an economy suppressed due to contractionary 
programs. Therefore, the structural reforms should have a supportive role in the 
economic restoration rather than put further pressure on the downside trajectory of the 
economy. Structural reforms indeed is the key for the last decades’ economic 
inefficiencies (Stathakis, 2010) but how realistic is to deal with them in a couple of 
years?  Moreover, the structural reforms in the current programs have little to say 
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about how the country can create its new productive structure overlooking the structural 
dimension of the national productive base (OEE, 2011). 
4.	  Concluding	  remarks	  	  
Economic crisis burst in 2009 in the Greek economy after the multiple revisions of the 
state’s economic data. At the same time great unbalances and uncertainties provoked in 
the financial markets after the bubble of the US real estate and the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. These facts along with the great influence of the financial markets and rating 
agencies in the real economy due to their capacity to generate future events constituted 
a very bad time coincidence for the Greek economy’s predicaments.  
 
The Greek debt surpassed the 120% as a ratio to GDP and the deficit proved to be more 
than 15%, well above the threshold of 3%. These elements designated that the Greek 
economy was unsustainable. Therefore, markets reacted through the toxic bonds 
transactions and the rating agencies downgraded Greek credibility. Borrowing was no 
more feasible for the Greek state, which faced a severe liquidity problem.  
 
At this point there were only two options: either to default or to enter a financial 
mechanism. The latter was chosen as more viable solution for the Greek and European 
economy. This brought the first memorandum that induced a program of fiscal 
consolidation in order to suppress aggregate demand. Indeed, Greek economy exhibited 
a demand greater than its competence to produce. Moreover, its weak productive 
structure that was anything than competitive in the single market could not reach an 
adequate level of exports and FDIs. In addition, the public sector was quite expanded, 
without being productive or functional due to the system of clientism and corruption 
that generated and preserved it. Therefore, the Greek economy was steadily generating 
trade and budget deficits that were financed by reinforcing debt.  
 
Troika and the Greek government agreed on a contractionary program, in exchange of 
financial support, that would firstly diminish state’s deficit and balance debt in the 
medium term. In order to achieve these targets, a series of austerity measures were set 
related to public expenses cuts, privatizations and tax raise.  Furthermore, structural 
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reforms were also considered of great importance in order to deregulate the domestic 
market and enhance Greek economy’s competitiveness. Most of them were unrealistic, 
like the 50 billion privatization plan, while others were mandatory with or without 
Troika’s presence.  
 
However, the over-optimistic targets were proved wrong soon after and a second stand-
by adjustment agreement took place along with the European concurrence for a Greek 
PSI. The reports on the Greek progress detected a constant divergence from the program 
goals despite the almost 90 billion debt reduction and the sufficient performance of the 
deficit. Consequently in the late 2012 came a revision of the second adjustment program 
with a mild privatization program and a greater push for structural reforms.  
 
As it seems, Troika did not manage to deal with the inherent inefficiencies of the Greek 
state and economy. Structural reforms could not be implemented in their greater part 
due to the ingrained linkage between political authorities and state mechanisms. 
Government was both unwilling and incapable to provide large-scale changes that 
would deregulate the market. Tax evasion was also impossible to be restrained due to 
the absence of adequate institutional context, monitor mechanisms and human resource. 
Therefore, the tax revenues deficit was counterbalanced by the tax rate increase and 
public cuts that burdened mostly the salaried employees, the pensioners and those in 
need of social services.  
 
The program of the privatizations proved to be a completely disaster.  The amount of 50 
billion was heavily unrealistic for a state that the only experience had in public property 
transactions was gained in cases such as “Vatopedi”. Moreover, no plan was conducted 
in order create a list of selling properties based on a development plan and their added 
value. Moreover, the great uncertainties derived by the constant changes in the taxation 
system, bureaucratic obstacles, government’s interdependency on Troika and political 
instability could not form a positive business milieu that would draw investment. 
 
Despite the failures observed, the Greek deficit was eventually restrained creating hopes 
for a possible primary surplus in 2013. However, this was achieved by an asymmetric 
distribution of the measures, as mentioned before, mainly due to policy failures. This 
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fact emerges serious questions about the sustainability of this achievement. For example 
the trade deficit was diminished due to imports reductions than exports increase, 
proving two things. First of all, the Greek economy did not enhance its competitiveness 
despite the domestic devaluation took place. Secondly, the domestic devaluation 
program cannot be sufficient if all Europe follows similar policies that do not allow 
absorbing some extra foreign output. Therefore, De Grauwe and Yuemei (2013) suggest 
the implementation of a simple rule ordering that every country with stabilized debt 
ratios can have an adjustment program of domestic revaluation in order to offset the 
deflationary stimulus of others. 
 
Moreover, the front loaded nature of the program generated continuous severe shocks in 
the Greek economy. Recession was quite larger than was initially planned. This is an 
outcome of Troika’s underestimations on the fiscal multipliers and on government’s 
incapacity to provide the needed reforms. Greek economy lost a major part of its output 
because of the tremendous cuts in the public sector, which was the greater producer, and 
the strong linkage between public spending and private investment. Therefore, the 
contractionary policy in the public cuts along with the absence of a coherent national 
development plan provided a loss greater than 30 billion in the period of memoranda 
exercise that led to deeper recession. 
    
In addition, the extended recession had a notable impact in the employment. 
Unemployment was almost tripled and the unemployment of the youth surpassed 50%. 
Despite the significant reduction in the labor cost unemployment continued to get 
magnified. Labor market was subject to great deregulations, inducing the model of 
mini-jobs and flexible employment conditions. However, it is apparent again the 
grievous absence of program for the reconstruction of the production base. On the 
contrary, Greece is experiencing a bout of “brain drain”. All these together generate 
various doubts about the way growth can be restored without jobs and without the most 
qualified human resource.  
 
Until now, the two stand-by adjustments programs and their revisions deliver very little 
of their initial goals provoking at the same time an excessive social and economic 
discomfort. Greek society can give no consensus for the promoting changes since the 
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trust to the political system has been raptured. The government’s incapacity, until now 
to provide justice and evenly distributed burdens creates unfavorable conditions for any 
kind of adjustment. Moreover, the so far performance does not create expectation for a 
sustainable development trajectory.  
 
The programs set reforms that have mainly direct macroeconomic impact, disregarding 
the further implications provoked. In addition, they are considered far from the Greek 
reality, requiring unfeasible goals. Structural reforms, albeit it is difficult to evaluate 
since most of them are not implemented, ask for general regulations with no focus in 
sectors with comparative advantage. However, Troika insists that no design error is 
more responsible for the programs failures than the incapacity to implement them as 
they are. Nevertheless, this position misread the inherent drawbacks of the program and 
gives no hope for their reconsideration.  
 
The Greek memoranda depict an austerity experiment in the western capitalism derived 
by the rigorous adherence of Europe –mainly Germany- to a strict monetary policy. 
This standpoint overlooks for the European roots of the Greek crisis derived by an 
internal asymmetry in the European architecture. The deflationary programs in the 
European South enhance this asymmetry and generate fears for the common future.   
 
Therefore, crisis could be resolved if only Europe get ready for the next step of political 
integration. This may be hard in times of uncertainty that states tend to nave-gaze. 
However, it presents the most radical proposal so far, even more radical from 
suggestions for a default and a Grexit as a crisis resolution, because it gets the idea of a 
collective response to the crisis. However, Europe’s blind eyes raise great discomfort 
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